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Abstract 
 Prior literature documents a positive relationship between dividend policy and 
corporate governance, and negative relationship between the quality of corporate governance 
and cost of debt. Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between cost 
of debt and dividend policy. Using a sample of firms from the MENA region (Middle East 
and North Africa), during the period between 2004 and 2008, we document a negative 
relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy. Our results remain robust even after 
controlling for various firm-specific characteristics. The main reason for this negative 
relationship is that dividend policy act as a substitute for corporate governance mechanisms 
in emerging markets. Prior literature argues that creditors take into consideration the quality 
of corporate governance while assessing the riskiness of the firm. High dividend payout ratio 
reflects proper corporate governance, which would result in a lower required rate of return by 
creditors, a lower cost of debt for the firm. 
 
Keywords: Cost of Debt; Dividend Policy; Corporate Governance 
Introduction 
 Prior literature documents a negative relationship between corporate governance and 
cost of debt. Bhojraj and Senpgupta (2003) show the existence of a positive relation between 
disclosure and bond ratings and a negative relation between disclosure and bond yields. 
Similarly, Zhu (2009) reports a negative relationship between the firm corporate governance 
level and the cost of debt. One of the reasons cited for this relationship is that improvement in 
corporate governance practices of the firm reduces information asymmetry. Hope (2003) 
documents that proper corporate governance mechanisms contribute in lowering the risks of 
the firm by reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Likewise, 
Newell and Wilson (2002) provide evidence that proper corporate governance enhances 
firm’s performance and reduces the risks perceived by outside investors. Since debt holders 
take into consideration the quality of corporate governance mechanisms of the firm while 
assessing the default risk of the firm, good corporate governance should result in a lower cost 
of debt. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between dividend policy and cost of 
debt. Several papers consider dividend policy as one of the major tools that firms can use to 
reflect proper governance practices in emerging markets and attract outside investors (La 
Porta et al., 2000a). These studies regard emerging markets as markets characterized by the 
pervasiveness of corruption, weak legal institutions, and expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Saidi, 2004). Such corporate governance weaknesses at firm as well as country 
level deter the development of capital markets and hinder firms’ access to external capital. La 
European Scientific Journal  September 2014  /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
512 
Porta et al. (2000b) argue that dividend payout policy can be used as a substitute for the 
corporate governance of the firm. In other words, firms, aiming to raise funds externally and 
repeatedly, have to build a reputation that they are protecting shareholders by paying higher 
dividends to facilitate their access to capital markets. Sawicki (2008) shows that firms with 
weak corporate governance mechanisms tend to pay high dividends in emerging stock 
markets to build or improve their reputation. This strand of literature argues that high 
dividend payout mirrors the low level of agency problems within the firm. Myers (2000) 
argues that when the corporate governance mechanisms and investors’ protection are low, 
outside investors would prefer high dividends rather than retained earnings. Similarly, Jensen 
(1986) documents how high dividend payout ratio contributes in lessening the agency cost by 
reducing the free cash flow that could be expensed on unprofitable projects. Therefore, firms 
paying high dividend are perceived to be less risky and experience low agency problems. 
Thus, management can use dividend as a signaling device to arrange for future access to 
capital markets at competitive rates. 
Using data from eight MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries, we document 
a significantly negative relation between cost of debt and dividend policy for the period 
between 2004 and 2008. This study uses interest coverage ratio as the proxy for debt. Prior 
literature associates higher interest coverage ratio with lower default spreads and thus lower 
cost of debt (Damodaran, 2001). Our results show an increase of 0.171 units of interest 
coverage ratio for each unit increase in payout ratio. Since higher interest coverage ratio is 
associated with low cost of debt, our result indicate a significant negative relationship 
between cost of debt and dividend payout ratios. Our results are robust even after controlling 
for a number of firm-specific characteristics – for example size, leverage, growth, and auditor 
type. All of the factors controlled for in our analysis can have significant impact on cost of 
debt. Our results, after controlling for a number of firm-specific characteristics, show an 
increase of 0.111 units in interest coverage ratio for each unit increase in dividend payout. 
We also show that our results are robust in different regions and different time periods. For 
example, our results remain qualitatively the same in North African region and in Middle 
East region. Similarly, our results retain their significance in different sample periods, i.e. 
sample period between 2004 and 2006 and between 2007 and 2008. An important finding of 
this paper is that it documents a strong and negative relationship between current payout and 
future cost of debt.  
Our results have implications in a way that it will enable creditors to better assess the 
riskiness of firms and help management identify ways to reduce the cost of debt, therefore the 
cost of capital in MENA region. Lowering firms’ cost of capital would enable the firm to 
undertake many projects that would have been rejected otherwise. This would increase 
shareholders’ value and contribute to the growth, efficiency and enhanced productivity of the 
whole economy. 
The paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses motivation and 
background for this study, while Section 3 illustrates our choice for cost of debt variable. 
Section 4 discusses the data used in this study. Section 5 presents assessment of the 
relationship between the cost of debt and dividend policy. Section 6 documents robustness of 
our results and the paper concludes with Section 7. 
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Motivation and background 
Corporate governance in emerging markets 
Investors have always been concerned about the relevant information, signals, and 
measures that would reflect the financial health of the firms they are investing in. Financial 
health of the firm would determine the risks of investing and thus the required rate of return. 
The need for relevant information and signals increase many fold in emerging markets where 
the corporate governance mechanisms are low. Prior literature suggests that insiders and 
managers do not disclose the information correctly in these markets (Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003). As a result, emerging market firms are prone to corruption, abuse of 
minority shareholders right through assets tunnelling, asset stripping, weak legal institutions, 
and insider trading and self dealing (Saidi, 2004). Prior literature, thus, documents increase in 
the fear of investors, delay in the development of capital markets, and inability of firm’s to 
access external sources of financing in these markets. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mention 
that “in less developed countries, including some of the transition economies, corporate 
governance mechanisms leads to substantial diversion of assets by managers of many 
privatized companies, and the virtual non-existence of external capital supply to companies”. 
Prior literature holds that the difficulty to raise external capital induces firms, 
especially those that need to raise funds from the market repeatedly, to look for innovative 
ways to distinguish themselves from their competitors. One such mechanism is the effective 
corporate governance. Newell and Wilson (2002) document that corporate governance helps 
firms improve their financial performance, enhance their market valuation, reduce risks, and 
increase investor confidence. By sending signals regarding the effectiveness of their 
corporate governance mechanisms, strength of investor protection rights, and lower agency 
problems, firms can build their reputation and attract outside investors to invest at a 
favourable rate with them. 
 
Dividend policy and corporate governance 
Prior literature considers dividend policy as an important mechanism via which firms 
can build their reputation. This strand of literature argues that high dividend payouts are an 
important tool that can signal lower agency problems within the firm. Grossman and Hart 
(1980), for example, document that high dividend payouts alleviate agency conflicts through 
the reduction of free cash flow available to managers. Similarly, Jensen (1986) concludes that 
high payout ratio can lessen the agency cost by reducing the free cash flow that could be 
expensed on unprofitable projects. The above strand of literature argues that paying high 
dividends reflect managements’ good faith and signals the low agency problems and the good 
corporate governance mechanisms. As a result, firms are able to raise capital at efficient 
rates. Gomes (2000), for example, documents that dividend policy may help firms raise 
capital by building reputation. He notes that by disgorging high amount of cash, firms can 
minimize the agency costs and improve their reputation and thus, enable them to raise capital 
at competitive rates. 
The above findings have been discussed and interpreted in various ways in the 
literature. La Porta et al. (2000b) formalize the above findings in a theory that is called as the 
substitute model. They argue that insiders interested in issuing equity in the future choose to 
pay high dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. An 
important interpretation of this theory is that even the weaker minority shareholder rights 
should be associated with higher dividend payouts. 
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 Corporate governance and cost of debt 
There has been an extensive literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and the cost of debt. Bhojraj and Senpgupta (2003), for example, show the 
existence of a positive correlation between disclosure and bond ratings and a negative 
relation between disclosure and bond yields. Likewise, Blom and Schauten (2006) document 
a negative relationship between corporate governance and the cost of debt. This strand of 
literature argues that good corporate governance mechanisms reduce information asymmetry 
between firms and other agents in the capital markets and therefore reduce the risk of the 
firm. Debt holders, being outsider to the firm, minimize the information asymmetry by taking 
into consideration corporate governance mechanisms of the firm. Better governance 
mechanisms signal lower information asymmetries, therefore allowing debt holders to require 
lower returns on their investments. 
 
 Dividend policy and cost of debt 
We have argued that dividend policy is an important determinant of the quality of 
corporate governance in emerging markets (La Porta et al., 2000a). High dividend payouts 
not only affect the reputation of firms vis-a-vis outside investors but also lower agency 
problems and information asymmetries (Grossman and Hart, 1980). An important implication 
of the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance is that dividend policy 
should also be significantly related to cost of debt. We argue that high dividend payouts, 
being an indicator of better governance, should be associated with lower cost of debt. Thus, 
firms paying high dividends should be able to not only raise equity at lower rates but also be 
able to access debt at competitive rates.  
 
Cost of debt 
Unlike many studies that use the yield on outstanding bonds as a proxy for the cost of 
debt (Zhu, 2009; Blom and Schauten, 2006), our study uses interest coverage ratio as a proxy 
for the cost of debt. One of the reasons for this choice is the unavailability of the data on the 
yield on outstanding bonds in the MENA region. This is due to the fact that the bond market 
in the MENA region remains the weakest bond market in the world (Abed and Soueid, 2005). 
The arguments behind the choice of interest coverage ratio as the proxy for cost of 
debt are based on (1) the relationship between cost of debt and credit ratings and (2) the 
relationship between interest coverage ratio and credit ratings.  
 
Credit ratings and cost of debt 
One of the most important ways to estimate the cost of debt is to add firm-specific 
debt premium to the risk-free rate. Prior literature considers credit ratings as the main drivers 
of firm’s debt premium (Baker, Hern, and Bennett, 1999). Credit ratings are usually assigned 
by agencies, such as Standards and Poor’s (S&P’s) and Moody’s. They define credit rating as 
the ability of an obligor to honor financial obligations and contracts.46 
Plentiful of prior literature has used S&P’s long-term credit ratings to proxy for the 
cost of debt.47 For example, Minardi, Sanvicente, and Artes (n.d.) argue that the yield to 
maturity of fixed income securities is strongly correlated to credit ratings. They also 
document significantly lower yields for well-rated securities in comparison to poorly-rated 
                                                          
46 S&P’s (2008) defines credit rating as a current opinion of the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a 
specific financial obligation, while Moody’s Investor Service (2007) defines credit rating as an opinion about 
the ability of entities to honor unsecured financial obligations and contracts. Consult S&P’s and Moody’s 
websites for the definition.  
47 See Mansi et al. (2004), Ghosh and Moon (2005), and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Lafond, (2006) for 
greater details. 
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securities. While, Baker et al. (1999) document that a decrease of credit rating of one notch 
from A- to BBB+ is associated with an increase in debt spreads by 30 basis points. 
 
Credit ratings and interest coverage ratio 
Prior literature documents that rating agencies take into consideration business risk, 
financial risk, and industry risk, amongst others, to arrive at an appropriate credit rating 
(Altman, Caouette, and Narayanan, 1998). This strand of literature notes that the rating 
agencies pay a special attention to Funds from Operations (FFO)48 to interest ratio and to 
interest coverage ratio while determining the credit ratings (Baker et al., 1999). These ratios 
reflect firms’ ability to honor their debt obligations. Baker et al. (1999) also note that credit 
rating agencies, such as S&P’s and Moody’s, require a specific interest coverage ratio for a 
given rating and that the highest interest coverage ratio corresponds to the highest rating. 
Furthermore, Altman and Katz (1976) use a multiple discriminate analysis to show that 
interest coverage ratio is one of the most important determinants of the credit rating. In 
another important study, Damodaran (2001) suggests the use of interest coverage ratio to 
come up with estimation for the cost of debt. He proposes the creation of synthetic ratings 
based on interest coverage ratio. He documents that higher interest coverage ratio 
corresponds to higher synthetic ratings. 49 These arguments confirm a positive correlation 
between credit rating and interest coverage ratio. 
The above discussion implies a strong relationship between cost of debt and credit 
ratings, and a strong relationship between credit rating and interest coverage ratio. By 
extension, this would imply a strong relationship between cost of debt and interest coverage 
ratio. 
 
Data 
 This paper documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in the 
MENA region. Our sample consists of 242 firms listed at the stock exchanges of eight 
MENA countries. The countries include Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Our sample covers the period between 2004 and 
2008. The choice of time period is driven by the fact that this period attracted significant 
interest from investors and regulators resulting in the increased market activity. 
Datastream, Worlscope, and Thomson Financials were used to assemble data of the 
following items: cost of debt, payout ratio, debt to equity ratio, market capitalization, type of 
auditors, auditor’s opinion, retained earnings to total assets ratio, revenues growth rate, total 
debt to common equity ratio, and total debt to common assets ratio. 50 We will, briefly, 
describe data in the following section. 
 
Cost of debt 
We measure the cost of debt by interest coverage ratio. Interest coverage ratio is 
defined as the ratio between Earnings before interest and taxes(EBIT)and total interest 
expenses. Table 1 documents the descriptive statistics for the cost of debt. Panel A presents 
cost of debt within each country, Panel B illustrates similar statistics for each industry, and 
Panel C exhibits descriptive statistics for the cost of debt for each year. 
The results in Table 1, Panel A, shows that interest coverage ratio is of almost the 
same range in most of the countries. The only exceptions are Egypt, where it is too high, and 
Bahrain, where it is too low. It points to higher cost of debt in Bahrain and lower cost of debt 
                                                          
48 FFO is the sum of funds from operations and cash interest paid. 
49 The method was developed by listing all rated firms in the US, based on their market capitalization lower than 
or greater than $2 billion, with their interest coverage ratio, and then sorting firms based on their bond ratings. 
50See Appendix – A for the definition of variables. 
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in Egypt relative to other countries in the sample. Table 1, Panel B, documents interest 
coverage ratio for each sector represented in our dataset. The results show homogeneity of 
cost of debt across all industries. The only exception is healthcare, where cost of debt is too 
high. Table 1, Panel C, documents interest coverage ratio for each year. The results show no 
noticeable difference through our sample period.  
 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
   
Cost of Debt (CoD) Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total interest expenses Worldscope 
Payout ratio (PoR) Payout is the ratio of total dividends to total earnings. Worldscope 
Size of the firm 
(Size) 
 
The natural logarithm of the total market value of equity. Datastream 
Total debt to 
common equity 
(LEV1) 
 
The total book value of debt divided by the market value of equity. 
Value of equity equals the total number of outstanding shares multiplied 
by the stock price. 
Thomson 
Financials 
Sales growth 
(Growth) 
The ratio of change in the firm’s revenues between two consecutive 
years Worldscope 
Retained earnings 
(RE) to total assets 
(RE) 
 
Retained earnings (RE) divided by book value of total assets. Retained 
earnings equals Beginning retained earnings + Net Income - Dividends Worldscope 
Choice of auditors 
(Auditors) 
 
This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the firm was audited by one of 
the big 4 auditors (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers); 0 otherwise. 
Worldscope 
Auditors’ opinion 
(Opinion) 
 
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the firm has received an 
unqualified opinion; 0 otherwise. Worldscope 
Total debt to total 
assets (LEV2) Total book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
Thomson 
Financials 
   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for cost of debt 
 
Dividend policy 
In this study, we consider dividend payout ratio as a proxy for dividend policy. The 
descriptive statistics for dividend policy are presented in Table 2. Panel A documents 
dividend payout within each country, Panel B exhibits similar statistics for each industry, and 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for dividend payout for each year. 
Table 2, Panel A, reports relatively low level of payout ratios in the sample countries. 
None of the countries have payout ratio exceeding 40%. This observation is in line with the 
findings of previous studies that document relatively lower level of payout ratios in emerging 
markets. An interesting observation from Table 2, Panel A, is extremely low payout ratios by 
the firms located in the UAE. The average payout ratio for the UAE firms is 16.98%. This 
can be due the high growth rate of the country’s firms that require firms to increase their 
reinvestment rate to take advantage from the available investment opportunities. However, 
weakness of corporate governance mechanisms may also be cited as a reason for such low 
average payout ratios. 
The results in Table 2, Panel B and Panel C, show that payout ratios are similar across 
industries and across years in our sample, suggesting homogeneity in dividend policies across 
industries and years. The only exception is telecommunications sector that reports more than 
40% of dividend payout ratios. 
 The following table documents the descriptive statistics for cost of debt. We measure 
cost of debt by interest coverage ration (EBIT / Total Interest Expense). Panel A documents 
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cost of debt for each country, Panel B documents similar statistics for each industry, while 
Panel C reports cost of debt for each year. 
Panel A: Cost of debt within each country 
 
Panel B: Cost of debt within each industry 
Industry Average Interest Coverage Ratio 
  
Oil and Gas 13.105 
Basic Materials 13.473 
Industrials 17.794 
Consumer Goods 17.256 
Healthcare 32.600 
Consumer Services 20.550 
Telecommunications 16.439 
Utilities 11.438 
Technology 9.521 
  
Panel C: Cost of debt within each year 
Year Average Interest Coverage Ratio 
  
2004 14.972 
2005 20.234 
2006 16.119 
2007 16.848 
2008 17.481 
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dividend policy 
 
Control variables 
Size (Size), revenues growth (Growth), choice of auditors (Auditor), auditors’ opinion 
(Opinion), total debt to common equity (Lev 1), retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA), 
and total debt to total assets (Lev 2) are used as control variables for this study. Table 3 
reports the descriptive statistics of our control variables. 
 The following table documents the descriptive statistics for dividend payout ratio. We 
measure dividend payout ratio by percentage of earnings paid as dividends to shareholders. 
Panel A documents dividend payout ratio for each country, Panel B documents similar 
statistics for each industry, while Panel C reports dividend payout ratio for each year. 
 Panel A: Dividend policy within each country 
Country Average Dividend Payout Ratio (PoR) 
  
Bahrain 37.848 
Egypt 34.520 
Jordan 36.911 
Kuwait 30.316 
Morocco 38.298 
Qatar 31.464 
Saudi Arabia 26.759 
United Arab Emirates 16.983 
  
Country Average Interest Coverage Ratio 
Bahrain 27.618 
Egypt 13.560 
Jordan 18.316 
Kuwait 15.820 
Morocco 18.444 
Qatar 22.438 
Saudi Arabia 17.795 
United Arab Emirates 19.185 
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Panel B: dividend policy within each industry 
Industry Average Dividend Payout Ratio (PoR) 
  
Oil and Gas 35.903 
Basic Materials 34.032 
Industrials 29.422 
Consumer Goods 30.517 
Healthcare 38.031 
Consumer Services 27.660 
Telecommunications 41.874 
Utilities 32.624 
Technology 24.651 
  
Panel C: dividend policy within each year 
Year Average Dividend Payout Ratio (PoR) 
  
2004 32.873 
2005 27.063 
2006 26.622 
2007 31.420 
2008 33.2181 
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for control variables 
 
Table 5 represents the correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis. It 
shows low levels of correlations between variables. This fact enables us to include all of the 
variables together in our regression equation. 
 The following table documents the descriptive statistics for the control variables used 
in our study. Panel A documents descriptive statistics for each country, Panel B documents 
similar statistics for each industry, while Panel C reports descriptive statistics for each year. 
Panel A: control variables within each country 
Country LEV1 Size LEV2 RE/TA Growth 
      
Bahrain 20.380 4.456 12.175 0.173 76.269 
Egypt 70.940 7.887 25.384 0.137 79.289 
Jordan 32.84 5.107 14.209 0.060 18.028 
Kuwait 58.022 4.582 26.024 0.148 71.308 
Morocco 79.809 8.818 22.563 0.075 33.545 
Qatar 44.775 7.843 22.923 0.070 361.270 
Saudi Arabia 61.137 8.410 25.443 0.092 117.318 
United Arab Emirates 54.188 8.038 23.682 0.100 79.033 
      
 
Panel B: control variables within each industry 
Industry LEV1 Size LEV2 RE/TA Growth 
      
Oil and Gas 75.514 5.741 28.810 0.126 64.342 
Basic Materials 82.815 7.682 31.509 0.098 189.720 
Industrials 55.348 6.929 23.263 0.128 44.996 
Consumer Goods 42.911 6.059 20.781 0.121 27.297 
Healthcare 11.621 6.684 8.894 0.091 10.045 
Consumer Services 38.687 6.470 17.421 0.113 38.219 
Telecommunications 73.720 9.200 23.750 0.123 36.539 
Utilities 55.905 7.216 23.339 0.052 14.766 
Technology 59.018 5.645 27.070 0.085 64.080 
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Panel C: control variables within each year 
Year LEV1 Size LEV2 RE/TA Growth 
      
2004 66.695 6.572 25.773 0.092 39.630 
2005 50.651 6.880 22.553 0.114 265.229 
2006 52.542 6.692 22.890 0.127 58.481 
2007 61.016 6.663 25.011 0.125 53.517 
2008 62.039 6.767 24.116 0.113 89.825 
      
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
Methodology 
The most obvious question while analyzing the relationship between cost of debt and 
dividend policy is to see whether or not there exist a significant relationship between the two. 
We test this relationship by estimating a regression with cost of debt as a dependent variable 
and dividend policy as an independent variable. If our arguments regarding the relationship 
between cost of debt (CoD) and dividend policy (PoR) are true, we should expect the 
coefficient estimate for the variable representing dividend policy to be statistically significant 
and positive. Our basic regression equation takes the following form. For the purpose of 
completeness, we will estimate all of the equations used in this study with and without year 
(YDum), industry (IDum), and country dummies (CDum).51 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) εβββ
βα
∑∑∑ ++++
+=
Ctry
Ctry
ind
ind
yr
yr
tt
CDumIDumYDum
PoRCoD 1
   (1) 
The result of the above equation is reported in Table 5. As hypothesized, our results 
show a significantly positive relationship between payout ratio and cost of debt. We 
document that an increase of 0.171 units of interest coverage ratio for each unit increase in 
payout ratio (without including dummy variables) and an increase of 0.202 units of interest 
coverage ratio for each unit increase in payout ratio (while including dummy variables). 
Since increase in interest coverage ratio represents lower costs of debt, our results indicate 
significantly negative relationship between cost of debt and payout ratios. The reason behind 
the negative relationship is that firms may use high payout ratios as a signaling mechanism to 
tell investors that they are properly governed. Good governance should result in lowering 
information asymmetry and thus reducing the cost of debt. Furthermore, high payout ratios 
may also indicate lower level of agency problems within the firm by signaling to the market 
that no excess cash is available with the firm to expropriate (Easterbrook, 1984). This will 
also result in lowering the cost of debt. 
 This table documents correlations for the variables used in our study. The sample 
period is from 2004 to 2008 and the countries represented in our analysis are Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.  
 PoR Auditor Opinion LEV1 Size LEV2 RE/TA 
PoR 1       
Auditor -0.014 1      
Opinion -0.005 -0.005 1     
LEV1 -0.087 -0.005 0.0567 1    
Size 0.008 0.447 0.0329 0.100 1   
                                                          
51  We used robust regression in STATA for all of the regression estimations done in this paper. Robust 
regression can be used in any situation in which you would use OLS regression.  When doing the regression 
diagnostics, you might discover that one or more data points are outliers.  These are the points that you have 
determined are not data entry errors, from a different population than the rest of your data, and for which you 
have no compelling reason to exclude them from the analysis.  Robust regression is a compromise between 
deleting these points, and allowing them to violate the assumptions of OLS regression. 
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LEV2 -0.141 -0.069 0.0384 0.886 0.037 1  
RE/TA 0.101 -0.020 -0.0074 -0.200 0.051 -0.160 1 
Growth -0.087 0.03 0.0098 0.023 -0.022 0.054 -0.115 
Table 5: Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy (without control variables) 
 
We may argue that firm-specific characteristics may have a role in driving the results 
of the above equations. For instance, larger firms may pay higher dividends and enjoy access 
to preferential debt financing due to their relatively lower perceived risk. In such situation, a 
negative relationship between dividend policy and cost of debt is caused by firm size instead 
of dividend. Mindful of the effects that firm-specific factors may have on cost of debt, we re-
estimate the above equation after controlling for several firm-specific characteristics. For 
example, size of the firm (Size) is used to capture for any effect that the size may have on 
cost of debt. Prior literature has shown that smaller firms are riskier than larger firms (Banz, 
1981). As a result, we should expect higher cost of debt for smaller firms. Furthermore, Total 
debt to common equity ratio (LEV1) and total debt to total assets ratio (LEV2) were added to 
control for the effect of leverage on the cost of debt. 52 Prior literature associates higher 
leverage with higher risk (Ahmed et al., 2008; Zhu, 2009). We also controlled for the 
governance environment of the firm by introducing two dummy variables representing 
whether a firm is audited by big-four auditor (Auditor) and whether the auditors have issued 
unqualified opinion (Opinion) regarding firm’s disclosure. Mansi, Maxwell and Miller, 
(2004) and Pittman and Fortin (2004) document that the use of big-four auditor is associated 
with a lower cost of debt, while Li, Stokes Taylor and Leon, (2009) document that firms 
receiving a qualified audit opinion suffer an increase in the cost of equity capital.53 Retained 
earning to total assets (RE/TA) is also used as a controlling variable to capture the impact of 
higher or lower retained earnings on the risk perception of creditors. Firms with high retained 
earnings are more able to meet their obligation even when the operations of the firm are not 
generating enough cash flows. This would reduce the default risk of firms with high retained 
earnings, and therefore their cost of debt. While,sales growth (Growth) is used as a proxy for 
the growth of the firm. High growth necessitates more external financing, but it has a lower 
cost (Zhu, 2009). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) εβββ
ββββ
ββββα
∑∑∑ ++++
++++
++++=
Ctry
Ctry
ind
ind
yr
yr
tttt
ttttt
CDumIDumYDum
TAREGrowthSizeLEV
LEVOpinionAuditorPoRCoD
/2
1
8765
4321
   (2) 
The result of the above equation is reported in Table 6. The results document that our 
hypothesized relationship between cost of debt and dividend payout remains intact even after 
controlling for a number of different firm-specific characteristics. The results show a 
significantly positive relationship between dividend policy and interest coverage ratio, 
suggesting lower cost of debt. We document an increase of 0.111 units in interest coverage 
ratio for each one unit increase in dividend payout (without including the dummy variables), 
and an increase of 0.128 units in interest coverage ratio for each one unit increase in dividend 
payout (while including the dummy variables). An important observation that should be 
emphasized is that the adjusted R² has increased from 5.40% in equation (1) to 34.3% in 
                                                          
52 The importance of the leverage ratios pushes us to use more than one proxy to capture most of its aspects. The 
total debt to common equity is more forward looking since debt is scaled on the market value of equity. While, 
total debt to total assets is backward looking since total debt is scaled by the book value of assets. Even if there 
is relatively high correlation between the two variables, the VIF value is below 10 for all the regressions 
estimated by us, indicating no severe multicollinearity. 
53Another strand of literature argues that a high leverage ratio reflects their good reputation in the market and 
firm’s their ability to raise debt more easily (Denis and Mihov, 2003). 
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equation (2). This fact means that firms-specific characteristics have a big impact on 
explaining cost of debt. 
 The following table documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend 
policy using equation (1). The sample period is from 2004 to 2008 and the countries 
represented in our analysis are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Variables significant at 10% are followed by *, variable 
significant at 5% by **, and variable significant at 1% by ***. 
Equation (1) 
   
PoR 0.171*** 0.202*** 
   
Year Dummies No Yes 
Industry Dummies No Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes 
   
No. of Observations 691 548 
Adjusted-R² 0.054 0.085 
F-Values 33.860 3.220 
Table 6: Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy (with control variables) 
 
Robustness of results 
In this section, we investigate whether our results are robust to different 
specifications. 
 
Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in different regions 
As a first robustness check, we re-estimate equation (2) for North Africa and Middle 
East separately. If our arguments are robust, the relationship between cost of debt and 
dividend policy should hold in both regions. The results of this estimation are provided in 
Table 7. The results show a significantly positive relationship between interest coverage ratio 
and dividend policy for both regions, suggesting that high dividend payouts are associated 
with lower cost of debt. The relationship is, however, weaker in Middle East.  
 The following table documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend 
policy using equation (2). The sample period is from 2004 to 2008 and the countries 
represented in our analysis are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Variables significant at 10% are followed by *, variable 
significant at 5% by **, and variable significant at 1% by ***. 
Equation (2) 
PoR 0.112*** 0.128*** 
   
Auditor 1.954 0.751 
Opinion 5.569** 6.146* 
LEV1 0.054** 0.109*** 
Size 0.441 -1.022 
LEV2 -0.834*** -0.979*** 
RE/TA 36.581*** 54.473*** 
Growth 0.000 0.007* 
   
Year Dummies No Yes 
Industry Dummies No Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes 
   
No. of Observations 486 386 
Adjusted-R² 0.343 0.358 
F-Values 27.72 8.09 
   
Table 7: Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in different regions 
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Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in different years 
As a second robustness check, we re-estimate equation (2) for different time periods. 
Our first estimation period is spans from 2004 to 2006, while the second estimation period 
ranges from 2007 to 2008. The results of this estimation are provided in Table 8. The results 
show a significantly positive relationship between interest coverage ratio and dividend policy 
for both time periods, suggesting that high dividend payouts are associated with lower cost of 
debt. 
 The following table documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend 
policy in different regions using equation (2). The sample period is from 2004 to 2008. North 
Africa comprise of Egypt and Morocco, while Middle East include Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Variables significant at 10% are followed by 
*, variable significant at 5% by **, and variable significant at 1% by ***. 
 North Africa Middle East 
   
PoR 0.1455** 0.0997** 
   
Auditor -8.582 1.391 
Opinion 12.082 7.126* 
LEV1 0.108*** 0.099** 
Size 0.044 -0.922 
LEV2 -0.958*** -0.944*** 
RE/TA -1.279 77.190*** 
Growth -0.004 0.007** 
   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 110 276 
Adjusted-R² 0.356 0.380 
F-Values 5.79 7.17 
   
Table 8: Relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in different time periods 
 
Relationship between next period’s cost of debt and current dividend policy 
As a last robustness check, we adjust equation (2) as follows to test the relationship 
between next period’s cost of debt and current dividend policy. The motivation behind 
estimating this relationship is driven by the fact that creditors take into consideration 
historical data, the historic dividend payouts, to assess the current riskiness of the firm.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) εβββ
ββββ
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   (3) 
The results of the above regression equation are provided in Table 9. The results show 
that current dividend payouts are significantly associated with next period’s cost of debt. We 
document an increase of 0.096 units in next period’s interest coverage ratio for each one unit 
increase in payout, suggesting a negative relationship between next period’s cost of debt and 
current dividend payout ratio. 
 The following table documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend 
policy in different time periods using equation (2). The first period consist of years between 
2004 and 2006, while the second period consists of years between 2007 and 2008. The 
countries represented in our analysis are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, 
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Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Variables significant at 10% are followed by *, 
variable significant at 5% by **, and variable significant at 1% by ***. 
 2004-2006 2007-2008 
   
PoR 0.122** 0.143*** 
   
Auditor 0.566 0.996 
Opinion 0.615 9.416* 
LEV1 0.106*** 0.110** 
Size -2.049** 0.471 
LEV2 -0.887*** -1.089*** 
RE/TA 59.351*** 46.201** 
Growth 0.004 0.026 
   
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 209 177 
Adjusted-R² 0.2970 0.390 
F-Values 6.92 6.50 
   
Table 9: Relationship between next period’s cost of debt and current dividend policy 
 
 The following table documents the relationship between next period’s cost of debt and 
dividend policy using equation (2). The sample period is from 2004 to 2008 and the countries 
represented in our analysis are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Variables significant at 10% are followed by *, variable 
significant at 5% by **, and variable significant at 1% by ***. 
Equation (3) 
  
PoR 0.096*** 
  
Auditor 2.294 
Opinion 2.850 
LEV1 0.078** 
Size -0.224 
LEV2 -0.069*** 
RE/TA 44.560*** 
Growth 0.005 
  
Year Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Country Dummies Yes 
  
No. of Observations 243 
Adjusted-R² 0.275 
F-Values 6.67 
  
 
Conclusion 
This paper documents the relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy in the 
MENA region during the period between 2004 and 2008. Our results show a significantly 
negative relationship between cost of debt and dividend policy. Our results are robust after 
controlling for different firm-specific characteristics and in different regions and periods. We 
argue that one of the reasons for this negative relationship is that dividend policy acts as a 
substitute for corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets. Sine higher payout 
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ratios signal lower agency problems and better governance, creditors can infer valuable 
information about the riskiness of the firm and thus can ask for lower return for better 
governed firms. 
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